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THE TEST THAT ATE EVERYTHING2: INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY
IN FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
There is little doubt that over the past thirty years, the most important doctrinal
development in the jurisprudence of constitutional rights has been the formulation, and
proliferation, of “tiers of scrutiny,” which are employed by the courts to reconcile
individual liberties with societal needs. These tiers were created by the Supreme Court in
order to formalize the jurisprudence of rights, and to reconcile the general presumption of
constitutionality and deference to legislative bodies with the inherently
countermajoritarian nature of judicial review. Originally, the Court created two tiers –
the highly deferential “rational basis review,” and the almost always “fatal in fact”3 strict
scrutiny – to structure constitutional analysis. These tests had their roots in the Court’s
Due Process and Equal Protection jurisprudence, but by the 1980s they provided the
dominant mode of analysis throughout the Court’s rights jurisprudence.
Whatever the merits of two-tiered analysis in Due Process and Equal Protection
analysis,4 in the area of free speech it was never adequate to explain the subtleties of the
Court’s jurisprudence. Rather, in addition to the strict scrutiny test (which was limited in
the free speech arena to content-based regulations of speech) and the rarely-invoked
rational basis test, beginning in the late 1960s the Court developed distinct free-speech
tests to assess the constitutionality of regulations of symbolic conduct;5 restrictions on the
time, place, and manner of speech in the public forum;6 regulations of commercial
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speech;7 and a number of other areas of free speech law.8 For a short time, chaos seemed
to reign. Beginning in the early to mid 1980s, however, the Supreme Court, and even
more so the lower courts and commentators, began to bring order to this tangle,
ultimately combining these various “tests” into a single, unitary standard of review which
has come to be called intermediate scrutiny (a development which paralleled, and drew
upon, the emergence of an “intermediate scrutiny” tier of review in the Equal Protection
arena, as the test for sex discrimination).
First Amendment intermediate scrutiny thus emerged as a product of the merging
of several distinct, and relatively narrow branches of the Court’s jurisprudence. Over the
years, however, it has attained central importance in the overall structure of free speech
law. Indeed, so important and ubiquitous has intermediate scrutiny become that Justice
Scalia has described it (pejoratively, of course) as “some sort of default standard,”9 and it
has been the standard of review in literally dozens of significant Supreme Court and
Court of Appeals cases over the past quarter century. Despite this importance, however,
scholarly analysis of First Amendment intermediate scrutiny has been curiously muted.
Geoffrey Stone’s 1987 article on content-neutral restrictions10 remains the leading, and
indeed the only significant comprehensive scholarly examination of this area of law, and
while Stone’s article is both thorough and insightful, the law has of course evolved in the
almost two decades since its publication.
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In this article I begin the task of plugging this hole in modern First Amendment
scholarship. In particular, the objective of this article is to explore how First Amendment
intermediate scrutiny came to be born, and more importantly, how this form of analysis
has been applied in practice in the federal appellate courts. And an examination of the
cases turns out to be extremely rewarding. The story the cases tell, in short, is that
whatever the theoretical merits and institutional convenience (for the Supreme Court, at
least) of creating all-encompassing “tests,” the lower courts have struggled mightily to
apply the intermediate scrutiny test with any degree of consistency or predictability to the
vastly divergent range of factual circumstances in which intermediate scrutiny would
seem to be the applicable standard of review. Furthermore, the style of reasoning
mandated by intermediate scrutiny results in judicial opinions which read as stunted,
unnatural, and sometimes dishonest. In other words, the growth of an overarching
intermediate scrutiny standard has created order only on the surface, masking underlying
chaos; and even worse, it has sacrificed much-needed subtleties for doctrinal simplicity.
I conclude with some suggestions regarding where we might go from here to alleviate
these problems.

TIERS IN FIRST AMENDMENT LAW
The modern jurisprudence of tiers has its roots in the post-Lochner era, when the
New Deal revolution forced the Supreme Court to reassess its existing methodologies. It
was at this time that the Court came to recognize that for reasons of institutional capacity
and democratic legitimacy, under normal circumstances legislation should come to the
courts with a strong presumption of constitutionality. As such, even in the face of a claim
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of an individual-rights violation, action by the democratic branches of government should
be struck down only if completely irrational.11 This presumption of constitutionality was
strongest in the area of economic regulation (a natural reaction to the excesses of
Lochner), but was never so limited. And thus was born the modern “rational basis” test,
under which legislation will be upheld so long as it is “rationally related to a legitimate
state interest.”12
While rational basis review provided an acceptable starting point for analysis in
most cases, from the beginning members of the Court recognized that it could not apply
in all cases unless the judiciary was to abdicate its responsibilities to check legislative
overreaching. This point was of course most famously made in footnote 4 of the seminal
rational-basis review opinion in Carolene Products, where Justice Stone pointed out that
judicial deference may not be appropriate “when legislation appears on its face to be
within a specific prohibition of the Constitution,” when it “restricts those political
processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable
legislation,” or when it is “directed at . . . discrete and insular minorities.”13 Restrictions
on freedom of speech would appear to fall squarely within Stone’s first category, and
indeed he cites two First Amendment cases in support of it.14 Thus even at the height of
the era of post-Lochner deference, in free speech cases the Court did not defer to
legislative or executive actions, as evidenced by contemporary cases such Cantwell v.
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Connecticut15 and Bridges v. California.16 The more stringent review in these cases was
not yet designated strict scrutiny (a label which did not yet exist in the Court’s
jurisprudence17); instead, the Court employed a number of different doctrinal
formulations, though the dominant one – invoked in Cantwell, Bridges, and a number of
other contemporary cases – was the version of the Clear and Present Danger test
developed by Justices Holmes and Brandeis in their famous separate opinions.18
Regardless of names, however, the Court’s methodology here provided clear antecedents
for modern heightened scrutiny in free speech cases.
The final step in the codification of tiered review in free speech cases was the
adoption of the formal standards of review developed in the Equal Protection arena – that
is, rational basis review and strict scrutiny – into the edifice of First Amendment law. In
particular, because rational basis review plays an extremely limited role in free speech
cases,19 the key event was the formulation of the rule that all content-based restrictions on
speech should be subject to strict scrutiny. Oddly enough, this incorporation appears to
have happened almost inadvertently. As Justice Kennedy discusses in his concurring
opinion in Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd,20 the
strict scrutiny test for content-based regulations entered free speech law via citations to
15
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Carey v. Brown,21 an Equal Protection case, albeit one involving speech. And Carey
itself relied on the earlier decision in Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley,22 another
Equal Protection case involving discrimination between speech based on content.
Regardless of how it happened, however, by the late 1980s the adoption of the two basic
Equal-Protection tiers of review into free speech law was complete, and seemingly
universally accepted.23

THE ROOTS OF INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY
The above description of the gradual adoption of Equal Protection tiers, while a
critical part of the story of modern First Amendment jurisprudence, is clearly incomplete.
For one thing, the Court has long recognized, and defined, categories of speech which are
completely (or almost completely24) unprotected by the First Amendment.25 But even
with respect to protected speech, there have always been a number of strands of free
speech cases in which neither the extreme deference of rational basis review nor the
almost-automatic invalidation of heightened scrutiny has been applied. It is these areas
of caselaw that form the roots of modern intermediate scrutiny.

Time, Place, and Manner Regulations of the Public Forum
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The first of the strands of cases that eventually emerged as intermediate scrutiny
has its roots in the very beginning of the modern, post-Lochner era, in a series of free
speech cases in which the Court declined to apply either the newly-minted form of
deferential, rational-basis review, or the heightened scrutiny of the Holmes/Brandeis
Clear and Present Danger test, presumably because neither seemed appropriate. Instead,
some sort of middle course seemed required, a form of analysis permitting the
accommodation of social and private interests. Thus in Schneider v. State26 the Court
struck down ordinances banning the distribution of literature in streets and other public
places, on the grounds that the State’s legitimate interest in preventing litter was
insufficient to justify such a severe limitation on free speech. Similarly, in Martin v. City
of Struthers27 the Court held unconstitutional a flat ban on the door-to-door distribution
of handbills. In contrast, in Kovacs v. Cooper28 the Court (albeit by a 5 to 4 vote) upheld
a ban on the use of sound trucks and loud speakers on public streets, on the grounds that
the government’s legitimate concerns regarding safety and tranquility justified a limited
restriction on speech. Finally, in a related line of cases the Court considered, and
generally struck down, ordinances requiring speakers to obtain licenses or permits before
engaging in particular kinds of communicative activities.29 The commonality here is that
in all of these cases, the Court was faced with laws which imposed substantial burdens on
free speech, but which did not involve flat censorship (in today’s jargon, content-based
regulations), and which did implicate significant, legitimate societal interests. The
26

308 U.S. 147 (1939).
319 U.S. 141 (1943).
28
336 U.S. 77 (1949).
29
See, e.g., Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948) (striking down permit requirement for using sound
amplification devices); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941) (upholding requirement of a license
before holding a parade or procession on a public street); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938) (striking
down permit requirement for all distribution of literature).
27

7

methodological solution the Court adopted in these cases was the “weighing”30 or
“balanc[ing]”31 of rights against community interests, to reach an appropriate
compromise.
In recent years, in particular since the early 1980s, the Court has somewhat
modified its approach to the problem posed in the above cases, which it now
characterizes as the imposition of “content-neutral,” “time, place and manner” restrictions
on speech on public property. In particular, it has replaced the general balancing
approach of the early period with a seemingly more formalized, 4-part test.32 Under this
test, as formulated in the 1989 Ward decision, time, place, and manner regulations will
survive constitutional scrutiny, provided that they are “justified without reference to the
content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant
governmental interest, and that they leave open ample alternative channels for
communication of the information.”33 The Court has further clarified that the “narrowly
tailored” aspect of its test requires only that the chosen regulatory means are not
“substantially broader than necessary to achieve the government’s interest,34 not that they
constitute the least restrictive means to achieve its goals. Finally, in addition to the above
requirements, when a licensing scheme is at issue the Court has held that the “regulation
[must] contain adequate standards to guide the official's decision and render it subject to
effective judicial review.”35 Under this approach the Court has upheld such varied
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regulations as a ban on camping in a park, as applied to a proposed “tent city” to protest
homelessness;36 a ban on targeted picketing of a residence;37 a requirement of using cityprovided sound equipment for concerts at a Bandshell in Central Park;38 a statute limiting
protests near “health care facilities”;39 and a requirement that a permit be obtained before
holding an event involving more than fifty people in a public park.40 On the other hand, it
struck down a flat ban on demonstrations on the sidewalk outside the Supreme Court
building,41 and at least a plurality applied the standard to strike down a flat ban on
leafleting at an airport.42

Regulations of Symbolic Conduct
The other key source of the modern First Amendment intermediate scrutiny test is
the Court’s jurisprudence regarding symbolic speech. The leading case here is United
States v. O’Brien,43 in which the Court faced a First Amendment challenge to a
conviction under a statute forbidding the “forg[ing], alter[ing], knowingly destroy[ing],
[or] knowingly mutilate[ing]” of one’s draft card, as applied to an individual who
publicly burned his draft card in protest against the Vietnam War. The question posed by
the case was thus whether the First Amendment forbade the application of a general
statute regulating behavior to symbolic conduct which conveyed a distinct, political
message. In assessing this claim, the Court created a new, 4-part constitutional test for
regulations of expressive conduct: such a regulation will be upheld “if it is within the
36
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constitutional power of the government; if it furthers an important or substantial
government interest; if the government interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.”44 Applying this test (albeit
with some dubious reasoning), the Court upheld the conviction.
Since it was adopted in 1968 the O’Brien test has become the definitive doctrinal
statement in this area. The O’Brien test has since been applied by the Court to such
diverse activities as the closing of an adult book store pursuant to a statute targeted at
buildings used for prostitution,45 the application of public nudity statutes to bar nude
dancing,46 and the application of the antitrust laws to a boycott by lawyers representing
indigent criminal defendants, seeking higher governmental compensation.47 In each of
those instances the Court rejected the First Amendment challenge to the regulation at
issue, and in the course has clarified that despite its seemingly strict language, the
O’Brien test is not an especially strict one.48

Regulations of the Mass Media
As the above discussion demonstrates, by the late 1980s the Supreme Court had a
fairly well-established, stable jurisprudence regarding time, place and manner restrictions
and regulations of symbolic speech. Soon thereafter, a subtle but extremely significant
expansion of the ambit of these tests occurred, effectively creating a new body of
jurisprudence. In particular, the Court began applying its time, place and manner and
44
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symbolic speech tests to assess content-neutral regulations of the mass media which
restricted speech which could not in any way be characterized as merely conduct, and
which did not occur on public property. By so doing, the Court appears to have begun a
process of converting its two four-part tests, which as I will discuss had in any event
begun to merge into a single test,49 into a general test for content-neutral regulations of
speech, or at least of the mass media.
The beginnings of this expansion can be seen as early as the 1984 decision in
Regan v. Time, Inc.,50 where a plurality applied the time, place and manner test to uphold
a federal statute regulating the color and size of permissible reproductions of U.S.
currency, as applied to a cover on Sports Illustrated magazine. The critical case in this
development, however, was the 1994 decision in Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v.
FCC.51 In Turner, the Court considered a First Amendment challenge to Congress’s socalled “must carry” rules, which required cable television operators to dedicate a
proportion of their channel capacity to, and carry, free of charge, the signals of local
broadcast television stations. In assessing this claim, the Court first, over a vigorous
dissent, concluded that the must carry rules were content-neutral, because they did not
facially, and were not intended to, benefit or burden speech of a particular content.52
Having so concluded, the Court then announced, citing Ward and O’Brien but without
much further analysis, that “the appropriate standard by which to evaluate the
constitutionality of must-carry is the intermediate level of scrutiny applicable to content-
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neutral restrictions that impose an incidental burden on speech.”53 The Court then
remanded the case to the lower court for application of this standard. 54
What is noteworthy is that the Court felt that the relatively deferential Ward and
O’Brien tests should apply even though the must-carry rules clearly (despite the Court’s
description of the rules as imposing an “incidental burden”) imposed a direct restriction
on speech by the mass media, and even though the government had no special,
proprietary justifications for its regulation. As such, the Turner Court appears to have
(albeit perhaps inadvertently) converted the time, place and manner and symbolic speech
tests into a general test for media regulations, or perhaps for all speech regulations, so
long as they do not target the content of speech. As such, the decision represents a
crucial step in the creation of an overarching intermediate scrutiny standard in First
Amendment law.

Regulations of Commercial Speech
The discussion above elucidates the process by which an intermediate scrutiny
standard was gradually evolving in the areas of “core” First Amendment concern, where
the State was regulating fully protected speech, including notably political speech and
speech of the mass media (i.e., “the press”). At the same time, however, a similar legal
evolution was occurring in other, perhaps less central but still highly significant areas of
First Amendment law. The most important of these developments occurred in the area of
commercial speech regulations.
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The term commercial speech, as used in First Amendment jurisprudence, refers
purely to commercial advertising; the Court has defined it as speech which “does no more
than propose a commercial transaction.”55 The category thus does not encompass speech
merely because it is the subject of a commercial transaction, such as the sale of a
newspaper or even the placement of a political advertisement – such speech is fully
protected by the Constitution. Until 1976 the Court understood commercial speech to be
completely outside the ambit of the First Amendment, and therefore subject to
unrestricted regulation.56 In 1976, however, the Court held that commercial speech,
though admittedly of lower First Amendment value than other forms of speech, was
nonetheless entitled to some level of protection.57 The exact level of protection was left
unclear, though the Court did clarify that some regulations of commercial speech are
surely permissible.

Four years later, in Central Hudson Gas v. Public Service

Commission of New York,58 the Court finally adopted a four-part “test” for commercial
speech regulations: (1) first, the Court asks “whether the expression is protected by the
First Amendment” – i.e., the speech “must concern lawful activity and not be
misleading.” If this requirement is met, the challenged regulations will be upheld so long
as (2) “the asserted governmental interest is substantial”; (3) “the regulation directly
advances the governmental interest”; and (4) the governmental interest cannot “be served
as well by a more limited restriction on commercial speech.” This test, despite the
occasional criticism by various justices,59 remains the governing standard in this area.
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The Central Hudson test has obvious parallels with the 4-part tests for time, place
and manner regulations, and for regulations of symbolic speech. There are however,
some important differences. Most notably, the Ward test for time, place and manner, as
well as the O’Brien test, are limited to content-neutral regulations. Commercial speech
regulations, however, may be, and generally are, content-based; but because of the lower
constitutional value of such speech, only intermediate scrutiny applies. In addition, in
application the test has performed quite differently from the content-neutral tests. When
originally announced, Central Hudson was seen as stepping back from Virginia
Pharmacy, by creating a relatively lenient test for commercial speech regulations.60 And
in fact, for the first decade of its existence the test was indeed applied relatively leniently
-- indeed, in 1989 the Court, in an opinion by Justice Scalia, seemed to further weaken
the test by clarifying that the fourth prong Central Hudson required only a “reasonable”
fit, not the use of the least restrictive means available.61 Since around 1990, however, the
Court has notably not been deferential to legislatures in this area, and has relied upon the
Central Hudson test to strike down such diverse regulations as a federal ban on the
advertising of compounded drugs,62 state restrictions on tobacco advertising,63 and a
federal ban on labels stating the alcoholic content of beer.64 This aggressiveness is in
stark contrast to the Court’s application of the Ward and O’Brien tests, which has been
notably lacking in force, and has made commercial speech law one of the most active
areas of modern First Amendment jurisprudence.
60
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Speech of Government Employees
Yet another area of free speech law where in recent years the intermediate
scrutiny standard of review has come to be applied is government restrictions on the
speech of public employees. To begin with, it should be noted that the issues raised in
this area of law have obvious parallels to government regulations of speech on public
property, since in both instances we are dealing with the government in the role of
proprietor (or employer), rather than in the role of regulator. There is, however, an
important distinction here which must be born in mind – in cases involving public
property, the intermediate scrutiny standard is limited to content-neutral regulations of
speech, where the government’s regulatory interests are unrelated to the message being
conveyed. In the public employee cases, however, the government is punishing precisely
because of the content of speech, in particular because of the potentially disruptive
impact of the message conveyed by an employee. Nonetheless, as we shall see, the
governing legal standards for these two situations have turned out to be essentially
identical.
The Supreme Court’s modern jurisprudence on the speech of government
employees has its roots in the 1968 decision in Pickering v. Board of Education,65 in
which the Court recognized that speech of government employees on matters of public
concern is entitled to constitutional protection. At the same time, however, the Court also
recognized that the government clearly has a stronger interest in restricting the speech of
its employees than it has in restricting the speech of the general public. As a
consequence, the Court stated, it was necessary “to arrive at a balance between the
65
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interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern
and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public
services it performs through its employees.”66 In short, the Court adopted a balancing
test in this area, which has come to be known as “Pickering balancing.”
The basic approach to public employee speech adopted in Pickering remains the
law today, essentially unchanged. Later cases have clarified some of the details of the
test, such as setting forth a framework to determine if an employee was indeed punished
“because of” his or her speech,67 and clarifying the nature of the “matter of public
concern” limitation in Pickering,68 but the essential balancing approach remains unaltered
and Pickering continues to be cited for this proposition.69 This balancing approach has
obvious resemblance to the Court’s approach to content-neutral speech regulations, and
as we shall see, the lower courts have in recent years tended to subsume it into the
general mass of First Amendment intermediate scrutiny.70

Regulation of Sexually Oriented Businesses
Regulations imposed by state and local governments on “adult” (i.e., sexually
oriented) businesses such as adult book stores, adult movie theaters, and adult “clubs,”
present some peculiar and distinct jurisprudential problems, which the Supreme Court has
dealt with in varying ways over the years. In recent years, however, it seems safe to say
that the jurisprudence in this area has largely merged with the general intermediate
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scrutiny analysis. As such, the regulation of sexually oriented businesses represents yet
another strand of modern First Amendment intermediate scrutiny.
For obvious reasons, both moral and pragmatic, state and especially local
governments often seek to impose special restrictions on the operation of sexually
oriented businesses. Such restrictions can take the form of zoning ordinances, 71
restrictions on multiple adult businesses in a single location,72 restrictions on completely
nude dancing,73 and any number of other types of limitations or bans.74 The reason such
restrictions pose difficult First Amendment issues is because sexual speech, so long as it
falls short of obscenity (as it typically does in these cases), is fully protected under the
First Amendment, and yet the challenged ordinances appear to single out such speech for
special, disfavored treatment on the basis of its content. As such, under the Court’s
traditional doctrine, such restrictions seemingly should be subject to strict scrutiny, and
be presumptively unconstitutional. Nonetheless, in a series of cases beginning with
Young v. American Mini-Theatres in 1976,75 the Court has upheld restrictions on sexually
oriented businesses without applying strict scrutiny. The key doctrinal innovation
adopted by the Court was its conclusion in the 1986 City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres
decision76 that so long as a challenged ordinance is directed at the “secondary effects” of
adult businesses (i.e., the crime and blight that they often are associated with) rather than
seeking to suppress the speech itself, it should be treated as content-neutral, and so
subject only to the test for time, place and manner regulations. The secondary effects
71
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doctrine is an extremely odd one, as it seems clearly inconsistent with the Court’s
approach to content neutrality elsewhere in its First Amendment jurisprudence, and its
application has been limited strictly to the context of sexually oriented speech.77 The
secondary effects doctrine has recently been criticized by what seems to be a majority of
the Court, and so its continuing vitality might be in doubt.78 Nonetheless, the basic
holding of Renton that regulations of adult businesses short of outright bans should be
subjected to intermediate and not strict scrutiny, continues to be followed.79

Charitable Solicitation
In three cases in the 1980s, the Supreme Court considered, and struck down,
various attempts by states to regulate professional, charitable solicitation.80 In those
cases, the Court made clear that charitable solicitation was not equivalent to commercial
speech, and so deserved strong First Amendment protection. At the same time, however,
the Court seemed to suggest that because of its nature (and intertwining with conduct
elements), charitable solicitation should be subject to “reasonable regulation.”81 The
Court then proceeded in these cases to apply an indeterminate form of balancing/tailoring
analysis to strike down the regulations.82
The precise doctrinal test applicable to regulations of charitable solicitations thus
remains somewhat unclear. The Riley Court suggested that at least with respect to
77
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content-based regulations of such solicitation, strict scrutiny should apply;83 though this
suggestion is in itself deceptive, because regulations of charitable solicitations by
definition target speech based on its content (a request for money on behalf of a charity),
and as such seem necessarily to be content-based under the general test. Nonetheless, so
long as the regulations do not restrict the speech a charitable solicitor utters, the
applicable test appears to be something short of strict scrutiny.84 In a recent Fourth
Circuit decision authored by Judge Wilkinson, the court recognized that there has been
some confusion on this subject in the lower courts, but also recognized that many courts
are treating the Village of Schaumburg test as converging with the general intermediate
scrutiny analysis.85 Moreover, while the Fourth Circuit itself did not resolve the
ambiguity about whether the test is properly described as “strict” or “intermediate,” it
then proceeded to uphold two quite broad regulations (issued by the Federal Trade
Commission) of professional telemarketing on behalf of charitable foundations – a result
which would be most unlikely under a true, strict scrutiny standard. As such, it would
appear that the test for regulations of charitable solicitation has indeed largely merged
into the general, intermediate scrutiny test.86

Regulation of Political Contributions
83
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Finally, another area of First Amendment jurisprudence where the applicable
standard of review might – and here it is important to emphasize the word might – be
evolving towards intermediate scrutiny is analysis of the constitutionality of statutory
restrictions on political contributions. The Supreme Court’s leading decision in this area
was the 1976 Buckley v. Valeo opinion.87 In Buckley the Court heard constitutional
challenges to restrictions placed by the Federal Election Campaign Act on both political
expenditures by candidates, and political contributions to candidates by members of the
public. Critically, the Buckley Court distinguished between expenditures and
contributions, imposing a substantially higher standard of review on expenditure
limitations than on contribution limitations, the result of which was the invalidation of
expenditure limits, but the upholding of contribution limits. In more recent cases the
Court has reaffirmed this distinction, and relied upon it to sustain numerous regulations
and restrictions of political contributions.88 If the applicable test for expenditure limits is
strict scrutiny, as it appears to be, then the test for political contributions, which is clearly
more lenient, and deferential, than the latter, would appear to resemble intermediate
scrutiny. And indeed, at least one lower court has explicitly applied intermediate scrutiny
to uphold a restriction on political contributions (there, a Michigan law requiring annual
consent if corporations or labor unions sought to use automatic payroll contributions to
obtain political contributions from members or employees).89
Having said this, it must be acknowledged that there are grave doubts about
whether the Supreme Court itself understands the test for political contributions to be
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intermediate scrutiny. In Buckley the Court explicitly rejected application of either the
O’Brien or time, place and manner tests to the statute before it (including the contribution
limits),90 and that rejection was reaffirmed in the 2000 Nixon v. Shrink Missouri
Government PAC case.91 Indeed, those cases suggest that the applicable standard of
review is strict scrutiny. In fact, however, it is obvious that the level of scrutiny the Court
has accorded to contribution limits from 1976 through to the recent McConnell v. FEC
case is simply not as stringent as traditional strict scrutiny. It has permitted the
government, in defending those restrictions to invoke such vague governmental interests
as preventing the appearance of corruption,92 and has explicitly deferred to congressional
judgments regarding the proper balance to be drawn in this area.93 This approach
certainly seems more reminiscent of intermediate than strict scrutiny, no matter how the
Court might title the test it is using, suggesting that in practice, if not in name, the
standard of review of restrictions on political contributions is evolving towards
intermediate scrutiny.94

MERGER AND SYNTHESIS
Merger in the Supreme Court
The various areas of First Amendment doctrine described above have very
different origins and very different pedigrees. Some, such as the public forum doctrine,
have their roots in cases from the 1930s, or even earlier, while others, such as the
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commercial speech doctrine and rules regarding adult businesses, are entirely products of
the last thirty years. Furthermore, the evolutions of these different strands of law reflect
quite distinct policies and concerns. The public forum doctrine, for example, reflects the
Court’s reconciliation of free speech rights with the government’s legitimate, managerial
concerns, and the symbolic speech cases reflect a similar reconciliation of constitutional
values with the government’s obviously legitimate power to protect society from harmful
conduct. Other areas of law, however, reflect entirely distinct policies. The Court’s
reasons for protecting commercial speech seem to sound more in substantive due
process/economic liberty principles than in free speech policy,95 and its reasons for
tolerating regulation of such speech are also distinct. Similarly, the cases regarding
regulation of the mass media (and, for that matter, the cases regarding political
contributions) reflect judgments regarding the power of Congress to advance diversity of
speech even if the consequence is to burden the speech of some, which has little or
nothing to do with the explicit balancing entailed in the time, place, and manner and
symbolic speech cases. The variation in these policies and interests, at first, lead to Court
to treat each of these bodies of law as distinct, leading to distinct formulations of the
relevant doctrinal “tests,” insofar as any such tests were formulated.
In recent years, however, these distinctions have been abandoned. Instead, the
Supreme Court has come to emphasize the fact that despite somewhat differing
formulations, many of the Court’s new “tests” share some basic, common characteristics:
under these tests, laws will be upheld so long as they serve some sort of a
significant/substantial/important governmental interest and are reasonably well-tailored
to that purpose (i.e., there were not unreasonably overbroad). First, beginning in the
95
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mid-1980s the Court began to acknowledge that there was little, if any, difference
between the time, place and manner test, and the symbolic speech test of O’Brien,
applying them interchangeably.96 About the same time, the Court through the “secondary
effects” fiction extended this test to regulations of adult businesses. Then, in the late
1980s the Court went further to acknowledge that its commercial speech test was
“substantially similar” to its time, place, and manner and symbolic speech tests;97 and
indeed went so far as to rely explicitly on time, place, and manner cases in weakening the
“narrow tailoring” prong of the commercial speech doctrine to require only that the fit
between the challenged regulation and the government’s aims be “reasonable.”98 Next, in
the 1994 Turner decision the Court extended the time, place, and manner test to contentneutral regulations of the mass media even when the relevant speech was not on
government property, and so no proprietary or managerial interests of the government
were involved. As such, by the mid-1990s, the Court had acknowledged the similarities,
and in effect merger, of what I have identified above as most of important strands of First
Amendment intermediate scrutiny. And so began the process of creating a new standard
of review, albeit a process not yet completed or even fully acknowledged by the Supreme
Court itself.99
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Synthesis in the Courts of Appeals
If the merger of the various strands of doctrine described above into a unitary,
overarching standard of review has not yet been fully accomplished, or acknowledged, by
the Supreme Court, that process has in fact occurred in the Courts of Appeals. As the
cases described herein indicate, there can be no doubt that the Courts of Appeals seem to
uniformly accept the existence of a single, overarching standard of First Amendment
scrutiny called “intermediate scrutiny,” which has emerged as a synthesis of the various
distinct bodies Supreme Court doctrine discussed in the previous section. Moreover, the
Courts of Appeals appear to have taken the next step, beyond the Court’s current
jurisprudence, of treating intermediate scrutiny as a, to use Justice Scalia’s words,
“default standard,”100 applicable to any governmental regulation of speech which, for
whatever reason, does not trigger strict scrutiny. As such, intermediate scrutiny has
become a doctrine of surpassing importance in First Amendment law as it operates in
action, in day-to-day constitutional litigation.
The use of the phrase “intermediate scrutiny” in First Amendment cases in the
Courts of Appeals dates back to two cases from the mid-1980s referencing the
commercial speech standard.101 The true explosion of the use of intermediate First
Amendment scrutiny by the Court of Appeals began, however, in the mid-1990s, as those
courts began to take account of the Supreme Court’s statements in cases such as Clark,
Ward, SUNY v. Fox, and Turner, that there were no significant differences between the
standards of review applicable in symbolic conduct, time, place, and manner, commercial
speech, and media regulation cases. Thus in 1994 alone, the Courts of Appeals issued at
100
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least six important free speech decisions explicitly invoking the intermediate scrutiny
standard, on topics ranging from economically significant regulations of the mass
media,102 to regulations of adult businesses,103 to regulations of highway signs.104 And as
the next Section indicates, that rate has continued apace since that time, if anything
accelerating in the current decade. Furthermore, as those materials also indicate,
intermediate scrutiny cases in recent years continue to demonstrate a tremendous range
and variety, covering everything from extremely broad, national regulations of the
structure of the mass media, to run of the mill local zoning disputes, to cases touching
upon the “War on Terror.” As such, the cases clearly establish that in the collective
vision of the Courts of Appeals, there certainly exists a unitary “intermediate scrutiny”
test in First Amendment jurisprudence, and further that that test has a very broad range.
One also finds in the cases repeated recognition by the courts that the various
strands of “intermediate scrutiny” doctrine are in fact interchangeable, and so need not be
distinguished. Thus in Hodkins v. Peterson, in evaluating a youth curfew ordinance, the
Seventh Circuit stated that the symbolic speech and time, place, and manner standards are
equivalent, and described them jointly as “tests that apply an intermediate level of
scrutiny to content neutral government regulations affecting speech.”105 The Seventh
Circuit has elsewhere acknowledged the equivalence of the Renton standard for adult
businesses and the O’Brien symbolic speech test;106 and Tenth Circuit, acknowledging
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the same equivalence, has then applied the test to a regulation of charitable solicitation.107
Finally, at least one court has held that a generally applicable “intermediate scrutiny”
standard, derivable from such diverse sources as the Pickering test for speech of
government employees, as well as cases dealing with political patronage and political
contributions, should govern challenges to the associational and speech rights of
government employees.108 Indeed, as the cases discussed in the next Section
demonstatrate, there is now a widespread willingness among the Courts of Appeals to
discuss and apply a generic “intermediate scrutiny” standard, often without any effort to
disentangle its forebears.109
The trend towards integration has proceeded so far in the Courts of Appeals as to
have important, substantive consequences. Two developments are especially worth
noting. First, there are numerous instances in which, as a consequence of the merging of
the various strands of intermediate scrutiny, the “secondary effects” analysis of City of
Renton v. Playtime Theatres has been extended beyond the arena of regulations of
sexually oriented businesses to which the Supreme Court has strictly confined it,110 into
other areas of First Amendment analysis -- with predictably troubling results. Thus in
Brentwood Academy v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Ath. Assn.,111 the Sixth Circuit relied upon
secondary effects analysis to hold that a regulation forbidding schools from using “undue
influence” in recruiting student athletes, including a flat ban on any contact between
107
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coaching staff and prospective students, was content-neutral and so subject only to
intermediate scrutiny. Similarly, in two separate cases the Sixth and D.C. Circuits upheld
a federal statute imposing extensive record-keeping requirements on any person
producing visual depictions of sexually explicit conduct, on the theory that this statute
targeted only the “secondary effects” of such materials – in particular, the production of
child pornography – and not the content of the speech itself.112 The analysis was thus
applied to a statute which was obviously facially content-based, in that it imposed a
burden on speech triggered precisely by its content, and where the evil to be avoided was
in no way a product of the plaintiff’s own speech, but was rather that of other speakers.
The above cases thus illustrate one systematic way in which the coalescence of
intermediate scrutiny doctrine has eroded free speech protections.113
Even more important than the expansion of the “secondary effects”
doctrine, however, has been the expansion by appellate courts of intermediate scrutiny
generally to govern any challenge to any statute regarded by the court as content-neutral,
regardless of whether any of the triggers to lowered scrutiny identified by the Supreme
Court are present. In other words, the Courts of Appeals have extended the intermediate
scrutiny test to all content-neutral regulations of speech, even if the speech does not occur
on public property (and so implicate the government’s proprietary interests), does not
involve symbolic conduct (and so raise the usual concerns about socially harmful
conduct), does not involve structural regulation of the media (with its own special
problems), and does not involve lower-value speech such as commercial speech or
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sexually explicit speech. Put differently, these cases apply intermediate scrutiny to
government regulations of private speech, on private property, solely on the grounds that
the regulations are not content-based.
Examples of this expansion of intermediate scrutiny abound. Consider for
example Casey v. City of Newport, involving a challenge to a licensing restriction
banning the use of amplification, as well as all singing, in a nightclub.114 The court
concluded that intermediate scrutiny (which it characterized as a form of balancing)115
applied because the rules were content-neutral, though it did ultimately strike down the
rule on tailoring grounds. Or consider Universal Cities Studios, Inc. v. Corly, where the
Court applied intermediate scrutiny to, and upheld, a provision of the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act which prohibited posting or linking to software which permitted
decryption of copyrighted materials, because the law was content-neutral, in that it
targeted only the functional aspects of prohibited code. Other examples include the
Brentwood Academy case discussed above, where the court upheld under intermediate
scrutiny a rule regulating recruitment of high school athletes, and National Amusements
v. Town of Dedham,116 where the court applied intermediate scrutiny to uphold a law
barring movie theaters from showing movies between one and 6 a.m.
A particularly interesting instance of this development is Rappa v. New Castle
County, 117 in which the Fourth Circuit applied intermediate scrutiny to largely uphold a
set of state and local laws banning advertising along highways, but with many exceptions
built into the ban (including exceptions for direction and traffic signs, for sale signs, and
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numerous other commonly used highway signs), as applied to signs supporting a political
candidacy. Crucially, the ban applied to all signs close to highways, including those
located on private property, and yet the court’s analysis in no way considered this fact
relevant. In each of these cases, the court was faced with a regulation of fully protected
speech, where there were no special considerations (such as government ownership) in
play suggesting a greater regulatory role for the government, and yet the standard of
review applied was no different from, and thus no more protective of, the standard
developed by the Supreme Court in the context of the assorted special circumstances
discussed above. As Rappa demonstrates, and for reasons discussed in more detail
below,118 these cases involve a significant and potentially troubling expansion of the
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence with important implications for what one would surely
consider “core” First Amendment-protected speech.119
The lesson to be learned from all of this is that development of intermediate
scrutiny matters, and is having a profound, systematic impact on the law of free speech.
To fully understand the nature of that impact, however, it is necessary to conduct a more
systematic examination of the Court of Appeals cases, to see what “intermediate First
Amendment scrutiny” means in practice. We now turn to that examination.

INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY IN THE COURTS OF APPEALS
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In order to assemble a comprehensive list of Court of Appeals cases applying
intermediate scrutiny to free speech claims, I conducted three different searches on the
LEXIS/NEXIS “US Court of Appeals Cases, Combined” database. The searches were:
1. “First Amendment” and “intermediate scrutiny”; 2. “intermediate First Amendment
scrutiny”; and 3. “intermediate level of scrutiny” and “First Amendment.” The searches
were conducted for all cases through calendar year 2005, and were last updated on
January 20, 2005. It is obvious that the resulting list of cases will not include all opinions
falling within the various categories listed in the previous section, since an opinion
resolving, for example, a challenge to a commercial speech regulation may not use the
phrase “intermediate scrutiny” (or some variant). But the above searches are likely to
identify almost all cases where the court was self-consciously applying the intermediate
standard of review to a free speech claim. Since the purpose of this paper is to explore
the operation of this new standard in the appellate courts, that seemed the relevant
criterion.
After the lists of cases produced had been culled for false positives and duplicates
(including multiple appeals in the same case), 113 cases remained.120 The earliest of
these cases dates from 1983, and the latest from December of 2005, demonstrating that
the intermediate scrutiny test now has a well-established pedigree. The cases, however,
also demonstrate that the test has gained substantially greater acceptance in recent years.
Of the 113 cases found, only 4 dated from the 1980s, and 47 from the 1990s. A full 62 of
the cases, over half, date from the six years from 2000 through 2005; and indeed, of the
47 cases decided in the 1990s, only 8 were decided before 1994. Thus of the 113
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relevant cases, a full 101, or 89.4%, date from the 11 years from 1995 through 2005.
What exactly the trigger for this explosion was is hard to say (perhaps the Supreme
Court’s Turner Broadcasting decision in 1994121), but that an explosion has occurred
over the past decade, creating a new category of jurisprudence, cannot seriously be
doubted given these figures. It is now turn to examine how these cases break down, and
what they do.

The Pattern of the Cases
The cases compiled were divided into the eight categories representing the
various areas of Supreme Court caselaw from which intermediate scrutiny evolved, along
with a ninth category of cases involving challenges to content-neutral regulations of fully
valued private speech, on private property.122 The cases were further classified based on
whether the government action was upheld, or the free speech claim was sustained. Each
of these classification decisions, of course, required judgment calls, sometimes difficult
ones. For example, many of the cases might have been placed into either of two (or even
more) categories, and the deciding courts sometimes wavered on their proper
classification – indeed, it is one of the theses of this paper that in recent years, the distinct
categories of intermediate scrutiny analysis have been blended in the lower courts. I
nevertheless placed each case within a single category, the one which seemed the best fit.
Furthermore, some of the cases resulted in remands, rather than clear conclusions
regarding constitutionality; in those circumstances, I classified the case based on my
assessment of whether the terms of the opinion seemed to view the law as likely valid, or
121
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likely invalid (for example, if the appellate opinion was reversing a clear result below
regarding constitutionality, I tended to classify the case as opposite to the result reached
below). Obviously, another analyst might have made different judgments regarding
individual cases; but these minor differences are very unlikely to alter the overall picture.
What then is that picture – what do the numbers reveal?123 The results of my
classifications are set forth in the Table that follows:

Category (Regulations of . . .)

Free Speech
Claim Sustained
2

TOTAL

11

2

13

The Mass Media

8

4

12

Commercial Speech

8

5

13

Speech of Government Employees

2

2

4

Sexually Oriented Businesses

23

12

35

Charitable Solicitation

3

0

3

Political Contributions

2

0

2

Protected Private Speech on
Private Property (ContentNeutral only)
TOTALS

14

4

18

82

31

113

Time, Place and Manner of
Speech on Public Property
Symbolic Conduct

Government
Action Upheld
11

13

Some clear patterns emerge from this Table. First, the cases were spread
relatively evenly across the nine selected categories; though one category – regulations of
123
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sexually oriented businesses – included substantially more cases (indeed, almost three
times as many) as any other category, reflecting a depressing recent trend across free
speech law. Second, the government tends to win – the constitutionality of the
government action was sustained in 82 of the 113 cases, with only 31 free speech
victories (i.e., the government wins 72.6%, or almost three-quarters of the time). Third,
the outcomes were fairly even across the categories -- in other words, the government’s
advantage is not limited to those areas, such as regulations of sexually oriented
businesses, where the Supreme Court has in recent years signaled a preference for
constitutionality. Finally (following from the above), there are a substantial number of
cases within the ninth category into which the lower courts have extended the
intermediate scrutiny test despite the lack of either weak speech rights or an especially
strong regulatory interest,; and in this category, the government’s advantage is if anything
stronger (with a 77.8% win ratio) than in the general run of intermediate scrutiny cases.
The patterns described above, simple though they are, have important
implications for the shape and efficacy of the law in this area. Before turning to those
implications, however, there is value in examining the reasoning and results in a
sampling of the most interesting cases from those compiled. Such an examination reveals
distinct, though complementary, patterns and lessons from a numerical approach.

A Sampling of the Cases
National Federation of the Blind v. FTC:124 The Fourth Circuit, in an opinion by
Judge Wilkinson, upheld a series of regulations issued by the Federal Trade Commission
restricting telephone fundraising by professional fundraisers on behalf of charitable
124
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organizations. The regulations did not ban such fundraising, but limited it in various
ways, including limiting the fundraising to daytime hours, imposing disclosure
requirements, and requiring fundraisers to respect a request that no further calls be made.
The regulations did not, however, restrict fundraising by nonprofit charities on their own
behalf. While acknowledging that the speech regulated here was fully protected, and of
high First Amendment value, the court concluded that the regulations were properly
tailored to advance the government’s interests in preventing fraud, and securing privacy
in the home.
Bl(a)ck Tea Society v. City of Boston:125 The First Circuit upheld restrictions
placed by the City of Boston on demonstrators during the 2004 Democratic Party
Convention in Boston, the effect of which was to limit demonstrators to a “demonstration
zone” which was separated from the convention space itself and surrounded by fencing
and some coiled razor wire. As the court described them, “the aggregate effect of the
security measures was to create an enclosed space that the [demonstrator plaintiff] likens
to a pen.” Noting that “the government’s judgment as to the best means for achieving its
legitimate objectives deserves considerable respect,” the court concluded that because of
the potentially serious security threats facing the Convention, the restrictions constituted
a reasonable balance between free speech and regulatory interests. The court
acknowledged that this was a difficult case, given the fact that the restrictions here were
significant and the regulated speech was of extremely high (indeed, arguably the highest)
First Amendment value, but nonetheless found intermediate scrutiny satisfied.
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R.V.S., L.L.C. v. City of Rockford:126 The Seventh Circuit applied intermediate
scrutiny to, but then struck down, a zoning ordinance restricting the location of
establishments featuring (clothed) “exotic dancing,” and in particular forcing such
establishments to locate more than 1000 feet away from schools, churches, residential
districts, or other such clubs. The court concluded that the City had failed to demonstrate
that its ordinance would in fact reduce the “secondary effects” associated with such clubs,
and that in any event the ordinance was not narrowly tailored because it might sweep in
some “mainstream performances.” In so holding, the court appeared to impose a fairly
substantial evidentiary burden on municipalities seeking to adopt such ordinances.
Hodkins v. Peterson:127 The Seventh Circuit, invoking the O’Brien and Ward
tests, struck down an Indiana curfew law excluding (with certain exceptions) minors
between fifteen and seventeen years old from public places during late night hours. The
court concluded that the law was not “narrowly tailored” because it lacked adequate
exceptions for minors who were engaged in First Amendment activities, even though the
court had earlier acknowledged that the law was not directed at, and did not have a
disproportionate impact on, free speech.
Casey v. City of Newport:128 The First Circuit applied intermediate scrutiny to, but
then struck down, licensing restrictions on a nightclub which prohibited all amplification
and (oddly) all singing. The court concluded that though both restrictions, even the ban
on singing, were content neutral because their purpose was to limit disturbance to
residential neighbors, neither restriction was narrowly tailored to achieve that goal. As
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noted previously,129 this case is a prime example of the extension of intermediate scrutiny
to a situation where the regulated speech is fully protected, and there are no special
circumstances (such as government ownership) elevating the state’s regulatory interests.
Universal Cities Studios, Inc. v. Corly:130 The Second Circuit upheld provisions
of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act prohibiting “trafficking” in technology used in
circumventing encryption or other “digital walls” used to protect copyrighted works, as
applied to the posting on a website of computer code usable to decrypt DVDs’ digital
protections. The court held that the provisions were content-neutral because they
targeted the functional, rather than the communicative, aspects of the code, and then
applying intermediate scrutiny found the legislation properly tailored. Again, this case
involved application of intermediate scrutiny to purely private speech, albeit in this case
the speech had a “conduct” element to it, given the intertwined communicative and
functional aspects of computer code.
Transunion Corp. v. FTC:131 The D.C. Circuit upheld a regulation banning the
sale of “target marketing lists” by credit reporting agencies. The court concluded that
intermediate scrutiny was appropriate, even though the regulation was arguably contentbased, because the regulated speech was of “purely private concern” and so merited
reduced First Amendment protection. The court then found the regulation easily passed
intermediate scrutiny. This too was a case involving purely private speech, and the court
pushed precedent quite far (relying, for example, on libel cases involving false speech) to
invoke intermediate scrutiny.
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Time-Warner Entertainment Co. v. FCC:132 The D.C. Circuit struck down
regulations enacted by the Federal Communications Commission which imposed
horizontal and vertical limits on ownership in the cable television industry. The rules
prohibited any single cable company from reaching more than 30% of the total number of
U.S. subscribers to multichannel video programming services (i.e., cable television and
direct broadcast satellite services), and prohibited cable firms from dedicating over 40%
of their channels to programming in which they had a financial interest. The court
applied intermediate scrutiny because the rules were content-neutral, but then struck
down the regulations on the grounds that there was insufficient evidence to establish that
the rules were necessary (i.e., narrowly tailored) to achieve the Commission’s objectives.
This case was of some importance, because it represented an important setback to
congressional efforts to regulate the cable industry.
Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno:133 The Ninth Circuit, by Judge Kozinski,
upheld a criminal statute prohibiting the provision of “material aid” to terrorist
organizations. The court applied intermediate scrutiny, citing O’Brien, but then found
the standard easily satisfied.
Michigan State v. Miller:134 The Sixth Circuit upheld a statute requiring annual
consent to political contributions collected from union members through automatic
payroll deductions. The court concluded (counter-intuitively) that the law was contentneutral, despite being limited to political contributions, on the grounds that the purpose
of the law was not related to content, and then upheld the law under intermediate scrutiny
as a reasonable means to ensure that political contributions indeed respect the wishes of
132
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union members. As with the Bl(a)ck Tea Society case discussed above (and the Rappa
case discussed below), the court here upheld restrictions directed at absolutely core First
Amendment values (assuming, as should be uncontroversial, that political speech is the
most highly valued under the First Amendment) by avoiding strict scrutiny, and then
applying a relatively deferential form of intermediate scrutiny.
Time-Warner Entertainment v. FCC:135 The D.C. Circuit upheld legislation and
implementing regulations restricting the rates charged by cable television companies.
Citing Turner, the court applied intermediate scrutiny, and then found the test easily
satisfied.
National Amusements v. Town of Dedham:136 The First Circuit upheld a
municipal law barring movie theaters from showing movies between 1 and 6 a.m. The
regulation was (obviously) content-neutral, and was found to be a reasonable effort to
control the noise and disruption caused by late night crowds. Note that this too is an
example of intermediate scrutiny being applied to purely private, fully protected speech,
on purely private property.
Rappa v. New Castle County:137 The Third Circuit considered, and largely
upheld, various Delaware statutes barring many but not all highway signs on or adjacent
to state highways, including signs on private property adjacent to highway right-of-ways.
The statutes were challenged by a candidate for the U.S. House of Representatives, who
wished to post campaign signs which violated the statutes. The court applied
intermediate scrutiny despite the fact that the laws clearly distinguished between
permissible and impermissible signs based on their content (e.g., permitting “for sale”
135
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and directional signs), because the purpose of those exemptions was not to suppress
speech, but rather was related to the function of the relevant property. It then concluded
that the statutory schemes were largely permissible under this approach, though it struck
down aspects of the challenged statutes on the grounds that some of the exemptions were
not justifiable under the court’s analysis. As discussed above, the obvious impact of this
case was to place substantial barriers in the way of political candidates, such as the
plaintiff in this case, who seek to use signage to obtain the name recognition necessary to
challenge political incumbents. As such, the ruling has a significant, and arguably
perverse, impact on political speech and the political process.

IMPLICATIONS
As the numerical analyses and summaries provided above indicate, close
examination of free speech intermediate scrutiny cases in the Courts of Appeals reveals
some extraordinary patterns and results. Moving now from the descriptive to the
prescriptive, it is time to consider what overarching conclusions may be drawn here, and
what implications this has for the future. As I will argue, there are in fact important
lessons to be gleaned from the above, relating both to the role of doctrine in a hierarchical
judicial system, and to its capacity to produce predictable and desirable results. I
conclude with some thoughts about where the Supreme Court might go from here, to
avoid or alleviate the problems that this paper has exposed.

The Supreme Court and the Problem of Coherence
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The first and most significant lesson that emerges from the above analysis is that a
very large disjunction has arisen in recent years between the Supreme Court’s apparent
preferences and policies and what the Courts of Appeals are actually doing. The doctrine
that the Supreme Court has created in this area of First Amendment law has simply failed
as a mechanism for control over lower court decisionmaking. In other words, the lower
courts are not following the Supreme Court’s marching orders.
What is the basis for this conclusion? Consider the various strands of the
Supreme Court’s decisions. As my description in the first part of this paper
demonstrates, even a cursory examination of the cases within those strands leaves no
doubt that in the Court’s eyes, all free speech claims within the general rubric of
“intermediate scrutiny” are not equal. In certain areas, the Court has been extremely
speech-protective, consistently upholding claims against even quite powerful
governmental regulatory interests. For example, in the commercial speech area the Court
has in recent years been highly receptive to attacks on regulations, striking down
limitations on tobacco advertising, drug advertising, and liquor labeling.138 Similarly, the
Court has also consistently struck down restrictions on charitable solicitations,
emphasizing along the way the highly protected status of such speech. Finally, while the
Court has not taken a consistent stance in the area of regulations of political
contributions, there can be no doubt that since Buckley v. Valeo139 the Court has strongly
signaled that such speech is entitled to substantial constitutional protection, and in recent
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years a number of Justices (albeit often in dissent) have argued that such speech should
be entitled to full First Amendment protection.140
In contrast, in other areas the Court has been much more, indeed resoundingly,
unreceptive to constitutional claims. Most notably, in the area of regulating sexually
oriented businesses the Court, since the 1986 Renton decision141 and through the 2002
Alameda Books case,142 has been extraordinarily consistent in rejecting constitutional
claims, going so far as to describe the speech in the nude dancing context as “within the
outer perimeters of the First Amendment, [but] only marginally so.”143 Similarly, in the
symbolic conduct area the Court has since the 1968 O’Brien decision144 rejected
challenges to content-neutral statutes with absolute consistency; indeed, so much so that
Justice Scalia, noting this pattern, has urged the Court to abandon any heightened
scrutiny of such regulations at all.145 Indeed, the pattern of cases is so clear in these two
areas of law that there is a strong case to be made that the Court has in fact adopted a
categorical balancing approach in these two areas, and resolved the balance against
speech claims. The problem is, of course, that if this is the Court’s conclusion it has not
made it explicit, but rather has subsumed these areas of law into general “intermediate
scrutiny” analysis, thereby sending very mixed signals to the lower courts.
The pattern of the Supreme Court decisions in this area is thus relatively clear.
Moreover, the pattern makes good sense, as a matter of constitutional policy. Close

140

Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 410-418 (2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting);
McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 540 U.S. 93, 266 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting); id. At 311312 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
141
City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
142
535 U.S. 425 (2002).
143
Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 566 (1991) (plurality opinion).
144
United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
145
Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. at 578-579 (Scalia, J., concurring); City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M.,
529 U.S. 277, 307-310 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).

41

judicial scrutiny of the application of content-neutral regulations to symbolic conduct
raises profound problems of manageability and interferes with legitimate legislative
policy, since essentially any conduct can be employed to “communicate a message”
(consider the September 11 attacks). And no serious theory of the First Amendment
would place regulations of sexually oriented businesses at anything but the outer
periphery of free speech policy. Charitable solicitations, however, are an essential
component of the activities of nonprofit organizations, which are in turn heavily involved
in political and policy advocacy in this country. Similarly, regulations of the political
process raise profound concerns about legislative interference with democracy, and so
with the “self-governance” rationale of the First Amendment.146 And finally, while
strong protection for commercial speech might be more controversial, it seems clear that
in recent years a number of Justices have begun to question the proposition that
commercial speech has systematically “lower value” than other speech protected by the
First Amendment.147
An examination of the cases, however, suggests that the Courts of Appeals have
largely failed to pick up on these cues, or these ideas. As noted above, the lower courts’
analysis of cases in different areas of “intermediate scrutiny” is very consistent –
regardless of context, the government usually wins. Indeed, insofar as there are
differences in outcomes, they seem to fly in the face of the Supreme Court’s guidance.
As noted earlier, overall free speech claims were upheld by the Courts of Appeals in 31
out of a total of 113 cases, or 27.4% of the time. In the highly protected areas of
charitable solicitations and political contributions, however, none of the First Amendment
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claims were upheld (albeit out of a small sample of five cases). In contrast, a surprising
34.3% (12 out of 35) of the challenges to regulations of sexually oriented businesses
succeeded, despite the lack of any success for such claims in the Supreme Court. In the
symbolic conduct area the lower courts were more hostile, accepting only 15.4% (2 out of
13) claims, though even that might be generous given the Supreme Court’s posture; and
in any event, the numerical breakdown in the symbolic speech cases is identical to that in
the time, place, and manner cases, where the Supreme Court itself has been far less
hostile to speech claims.148 It is only in the commercial speech area that there is some
significant evidence that the Court’s cues are being read – the lower courts have accepted
5 out of 13, or 38.5% of claims, which is obviously substantially higher than the average
overall. Even here, however, some doubts arise. A 38.5% win ratio (barely higher than 1
out of 3) seems rather low, given the trend of cases in the Supreme Court, the seeming,
gradual merger of commercial speech doctrine with the doctrine governing fullyprotected speech, and the fact that commercial speech regulations are essentially always
content-based.
What explains the gap between the Supreme Court’s decisions and lower court
applications of those decisions? One possible answer is deliberate defiance – lower court
judges simply do not share the assessments of the Justices regarding the relative weights
of speech and regulatory interests, and so are reaching different conclusions. But this
does not seem a terribly plausible story. It seems exceedingly unlikely, for example, that
a large number of federal appellate judges think that pornographic theaters and nude
dancing constitute more valuable speech than charitable solicitation or political
contributions. And in any event, the opinions themselves do not suggest any consistent
148
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pattern of criticism of the Court’s decisions, making a pattern of such consistent
divergence unlikely to be a product of conscious disregard.
Another possible explanation for the discrepancies between Supreme Court and
appellate outcomes is case selection – i.e., that in the categories where government win
rates are high, plaintiffs tend to bring weaker claims. This explanation (though harder to
refute without a more detailed, and inevitably subjective, examination of all of the cases
in my sample) also seems inadequate. In particular, with respect to regulations of
sexually oriented businesses, given the obvious, strong economic incentives of plaintiffs
in those cases to challenge regulations even when the claim on the merits is relatively
weak, one would expect a lower win ratio than in other areas of intermediate scrutiny; yet
the result is the opposite. And while economic incentives to bring weak claims
(combined, presumably, with a bias in the certiorari process for the Supreme Court to
hear relatively strong claims) might explain the lack of plaintiff success in political
contribution and charitable solicitation cases, that bias seems hardly sufficient to explain
a 0% success rate. Finally, an examination of individual appellate case in areas where the
Supreme Court has accorded strong protection, such as commercial speech149 and
charitable solicitation,150 strongly suggests that in a number of them, appellate courts
rejected constitutional challenges which the Court would have sustained. Thus case
149
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selection also seems a poor, or at least insufficient, explanation for why results in
appellate intermediate scrutiny cases diverge so sharply from those in the Supreme Court.
Rather, the problem here seems to stem from the very shape, the structure, of the
Court’s doctrine in this area. As noted above, the common characteristic of all of the
various intermediate scrutiny “tests” announced by the Supreme Court is a requirement
that a reviewing court examine both the strength of the (important/substantial/significant)
governmental interest asserted in support of the regulation, and the level of “tailoring” of
the regulation (including, notably the availability of alternate channels of
communication). In fact, however, as Geoffrey Stone noted almost twenty years ago, all
of these tests clearly constitute an implicit form of balancing (albeit some of them might
constitute categorical, rather than case-by-case balancing).151 A number of Court of
Appeals decisions recognize that intermediate scrutiny constitutes a form of balancing,152
and of course the Pickering test for restrictions on the speech of government employees
has always been described as “Pickering balancing.”153 Moreover, balancing follows
naturally from the very vacuity of the intermediate scrutiny formulations. The tests, or
test, require courts to assess whether a government interest is “important” or “substantial”
or “significant,” but that inquiry obviously cannot be made in a vacuum, especially given
the malleability of the intermediate scrutiny formulations (what exactly is an “important”
or “significant” policy?), and given the institutional limitations on the ability of courts to
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make such policy judgments regarding the abstract strength of a social policy.154 Instead,
the tests inevitably invite courts to compare – i.e., to balance – the strength of the
asserted policy against the constitutional interests on the other side. Tailoring analysis
factors into this balancing because it informs one’s judgments regarding the extent and
necessity of the burden on speech interests. The difficulty is that such a balancing
approach, with no further elucidation (and the Supreme Court, at least in enunciating
doctrine has given none), provides little or no guidance about how to balance. In
particular, it does not clarify what kinds of speech rights should be highly valued (or
concomitantly, what kinds should not), and what kinds of regulatory interests, in what
contexts, should be given more or less weight. Indeed, the falling back onto vaguely
articulated balancing tests seems almost an admission of the Supreme Court’s inability to
articulate such standards. But the inevitable result of that inability is, of course,
unpredictability and inconsistency.
Another way to describe the jurisprudential difficulty in this area is that the
Courts of Appeals have demonstrated a systematic inability to calibrate their
constitutional analysis to the relative strengths of the speech and regulatory interests in
individual cases. The sharp disjunctions described above between the Supreme Court’s
decisions and the results in the lower courts, especially in the areas of charitable speech,
political contributions, and time, place, and manner restrictions, are indicative of this
phenomenon, since they seem to evince an inability to grapple with the fact that the
speech in such cases matters, and should be given at least a presumption of protection,
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albeit not an absolute one. Even more salient are the outcomes in cases involving
content-neutral regulations of the mass media, as well as of private, fully protected
speech on private property (the area into which the lower courts have extended the
intermediate scrutiny jurisprudence). These are all cases in which the regulated speech is
fully protected, and therefore presumptively of high value (especially, of course, in the
context of mass media regulation). At the same time, there are not cases where the State
has special interests, either as a proprietor (as is true in the time, place, and manner/public
forum and government employee cases) or as a regulator (as is true in the symbolic
conduct cases). And yet, in the Courts of Appeals there is simply no significant
difference between these and other intermediate scrutiny cases. In the mass media
category, the success rate of First Amendment claims is 33.3% (4 out of 12), only
marginally higher than the overall 27.4% rate; and in the private speech cases, the success
rate is only 22.2% (4 out of 18), lower than the overall rate, and lower than the success
rate in commercial speech (38.5%) and sexually oriented businesses (34.3%) categories.
These results simply make no social sense.
In addition to being unprincipled and unpredictable, that fact that intermediate
scrutiny has over time collapsed into undifferentiated balancing also probably explains
the substantial advantage enjoyed by the government in these cases. The difficulty is
this: in any intermediate scrutiny case, a reviewing court is being asked to compare a
burden on speech against a claimed regulatory objective. By definition, however, in any
individual intermediate scrutiny case, the speech interest is going to be relatively
marginal, either because the regulation does not target communicative impact, because it
is targeted at “low value” speech, or perhaps both (both factors would seem to be in play
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in the symbolic conduct cases, for example). This is true by definition because if the
speech interests were not reduced, the court would be applying strict, not intermediate
scrutiny. On the other hand, the regulatory interests in intermediate scrutiny cases are no
less weighty than in strict scrutiny cases. Indeed, they are often weightier, because
intermediate scrutiny is often applied in contexts such as commercial speech, regulation
of conduct, or regulation of publicly owned property, where the government’s regulatory
interests are particularly powerful. The result is a systematic bias in judicial perceptions
and decisions in favor of the government, resulting in a rejection of First Amendment
claims in almost three-quarters of cases.155
But, one might argue, isn’t that entirely appropriate given the relative weights of
the constitutional and regulatory interests here? Perhaps so in any individual case, since
in no individual case does the loss of free speech seem all that significant. Furthermore,
absent a theoretically grounded base rate, there is no way to know whether the actual win
rate for the government one sees in the cases (72.6%) is “too high” or “too low.” I do not
claim to possess any theory for derive such a base rate, and indeed doubt that such a base
rate can be meaningfully defined with the decision rule is as amorphous as case-by-case
balancing. The problem is that the cumulative effects of a large number of decisions, all
prone to the same pro-government bias, leads to the suppression of a great deal of speech
indeed, so much so as to potentially skew the shape of political and cultural debate.
Consider, for example, the cumulative effect of cases such as Bl(a)ck Tea Society and
Rappa,156 upholding very intrusive restrictions on the time and place of core, political
speech. Such restrictions are far more likely to burden political insurgents or “the poorly
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financed causes of little people,”157 than political incumbents or socially powerful
interests, resulting in an entrenchment of governing interests and ideas -- the very
opposite of the purposes of the First Amendment. Similarly, the consistent validation of
restrictions on charitable solicitations threatens to hamstring nongovernmental
organizations, which provide an important source of social dissent. And the (fairly)
consistent sustaining of structural regulations of the mass media also gives the state a tool
to exert pressures on, and extract favors from, the institutional media, thereby restricting
yet another source of dissent or oversight. None of this is to say that Armageddon is
upon us, or that our democracy is on the verge of collapse; but it is to say that the
intermediate scrutiny cases do contribute to the general weakening of “debate on public
issues [that is] uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.”158
It must be understood that the above arguments should not necessarily be
considered a wholesale condemnation of balancing methodology (though such
condemnations might be appropriate, and certainly have been offered elsewhere).159
There is nothing about balancing as a methodology that necessarily precludes judges
from carefully considering the relative strengths, in each individual case, of speech and
regulatory interests. The difficulty is that the intermediate scrutiny doctrine, as
articulated by the Supreme Court, does not provide any guidance on how such
assessments should be made, thereby eliminating any hope that the Court can assert
control over (and consistency among) appellate courts applying its precedents. And
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furthermore, the pattern of appellate results and their variation from the Supreme Court’s
articulated preferences suggest that in practice the lower courts, in applying intermediate
scrutiny, have failed to take into account in any systematic way such obviously relevant
factors as the value of the different kinds speech, and whether there exists any special
need for regulation in different spheres of life and activity. The question that obviously
remains is whether there exist strategies by which doctrine might be reformed to advance
the complementary goals of control, consistency, and principle in this area of First
Amendment jurisprudence.

A Call for Disaggregation
The fundamental irrationalities and inconsistencies that one observes in the
“intermediate scrutiny” free speech caselaw in the Courts of Appeals appear to be a
direct, and rather predictable, product of the imprecision and malleability of the doctrine
announced by the Supreme Court. This imprecision and malleability appear in turn to be
direct results of the fact that the “test,” or “tests,” that constitute intermediate scrutiny
inevitably collapse into unguided balancing. One might therefore be tempted to conclude
that the only solution to the problem is to abandon balancing altogether. Such a radical
solution, however, is not necessary, and furthermore is probably not even desirable.
Instead, a better and more achievable goal might be to move towards more focused, and
targeted, doctrinal tests, albeit tests which still incorporate an element of balancing.
Taking the desirability point first, it is not at all clear that balancing can or should
be eliminated altogether from the various areas of law that constitute intermediate
scrutiny. As Geoffrey Stone has argued, reduced scrutiny of content-neutral regulations,
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and some element of balancing (whether categorical or case-by-case), may be
unavoidable in resolving these cases. The reason is simple. As noted above,160
intermediate scrutiny cases are by definition cases where the Court has concluded that
strict scrutiny should not apply, because of some combination of the lower value of
protected speech (as in the commercial and sexual speech cases), the strong societal
interests at stake (as in the public property, symbolic conduct, government employee and
political contribution cases), or simply because of lessened concerns about governmental
misconduct (as in the mass media and pure content-neutral cases).161 Nonetheless,
because of the highly preferred status of free speech in our constitutional ideology, the
Court also does not believe that the utterly supine rational basis standard is appropriate in
these cases. Thus in every intermediate scrutiny case some difficult reconciliation of
speech and regulatory interests will be necessary. And that need would seem to lead
logically to balancing – even if with respect to some kinds of speech or regulations, the
result of balancing is to conclude (as in the child pornography context)162 that
constitutional claims should be rejected on a categorical basis.
Balancing thus may be inevitable here. But it need not be unguided, unfettered
balancing. The lack of guidance, indeed the chaos, in this area is not a result of balancing
as such, it is a result of the vague and open-ended nature of the tests the Court has
fashioned here -- the ultimate in doctrinal mush. That mush is an inevitable consequence
of trying to deal with the extraordinarily varied issues and problems which arise in the
various areas of doctrine that have been subsumed into intermediate scrutiny through one
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overarching “test.” But that step, the creation of a single, indivisible middle tier in free
speech law, was neither necessary nor desirable, and it should be reversed.
In short, the solution here is disaggregation, the dismantling of the intermediate
scrutiny test into its constituent parts. The primary benefit of such disaggregation is that
it will permit the development of a more detailed jurisprudence (or more accurately,
multiple bodies of jurisprudence) regarding how courts should balance speech and
societal interests in different areas of free speech law. In particular, such a jurisprudence
could begin to articulate standards regarding what kinds of speech, and what kinds of
regulatory interests, should be accorded more or less weight (or indeed, any weight at all)
in each of the different areas of law which have been combined into intermediate
scrutiny– including in some instances, perhaps, a categorical conclusion that certain kinds
of free speech claims should always be rejected.163 Such bodies of jurisprudence could
substantially reduce the disjunction between appellate decisions and the Supreme Court’s
apparent preferences, as well as the seeming randomness of the results in the lower
courts.164
To understand fully why disaggregation holds promise for such desirable
outcomes, some further explanation is necessary. One key insight here is that that speech
interests are not equally strong across these different areas of law. It seems obvious that
media speech, charitable solicitations, and political speech generally, whether it be on
163
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public property, by government employees, or completely private, has greater
constitutional value than sexual speech. The Court should make that an overt element of
its precedent. Similarly, the Court should and must explicitly resolve the question of
whether commercial speech is, or is not, systematically of lower value than the kinds of
scientific, artistic, and literary speech that receive full First Amendment protection. Such
guidance should have a substantial impact on disciplining balancing.
Even more significant than recognition of the varying strength of speech interests
(which is, after all, implicit in current law), the law in this area would benefit greatly
from the realization that different state regulatory interests should not be accorded
equivalent weights when invoked to regulate different kinds of speech. Consider, for
example, the governmental proprietary interests in order, management, and bureaucratic
discipline which so often underlie restrictions on speech on public property, or speech by
government employees – such interests can and should certainly be accorded great weight
in those contexts, but not in other areas of free speech law. Similarly, the kinds of
interests in preventing harm, combined with manageability concerns, which so often
justify the application of generally applicable laws to symbolic conduct should be given
less or even no weight when regulation specifically targets speech such as commercial
speech, mass media operations, and charitable solicitation. Or again, the acknowledged
interests in preventing false or even misleading speech in the commercial speech and
charitable solicitations contexts should have little or no relevance for regulations of other
speech (including most especially political speech) or of the mass media. Concomitantly,
if commercial speech is truly of high First Amendment value, perhaps no other regulatory
interests should be permitted.
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Indeed, a careful examination of relevant and irrelevant regulatory interests has
promise for entirely revolutionizing some areas of intermediate scrutiny law. In mass
media cases, for example, there is a powerful argument to the made that the only
permissible state interest should be one in preserving competition and a diversity of
voices, without preferring any specific speech or speakers.165 Similarly, when speech of
government employees is at issue, why should any suppression be permitted when the
relevant speech is not on government property, and does not disclose confidential
information? Surely in those circumstances the State’s proprietary interests are only most
marginally involved, and if that is the case, what reason is there for reduced protection of
the speech? Finally, with respect to regulation of sexual speech and sexually oriented
businesses, the Court might articulate with greater precision what exactly are the relevant
regulatory interests here. Is it secondary effects -- and if so, what kinds of secondary
effects? Is it protection of children? If so, protection from what, and what role do
parental preferences play here?166 Or is it simply because nudity and depictions of
sexuality are “contra bonos mores,” to quote Justice Scalia?167 Lower courts might like
to know.
Would such greater specificity in doctrinal formulations make any difference in
individual cases? There are of course no guarantees, but it might. Consider for example
the Bl(a)ck Tea Society case, involving demonstrators at the 2004 Democratic National
Convention,168 the National Federation of the Blind case involving regulation of
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charitable solicitations,169 or the Rappa case concerning roadside signs.170 In each of
those cases, the appellate court might have reached different results if it had given more
weight to the fact that the suppressed speech was of very high value. Concomitantly, in
the 2001 Time-Warner Entertainment case,171 the D.C. Circuit might have been more
tolerant of the cable industry regulations it struck down if it had acknowledged the power
of the governmental interest in maintaining competition and a diversity of voices.
Another case, this time in the commercial speech arena, where more specificity might
have made a difference is Anheuser-Busch v. Schmoke,172 where the Fourth Circuit
upheld a flat ban on billboard advertising of alcoholic products in most of the City of
Baltimore. Given the later result in Lorillard Tobacco in which the Supreme Court
struck down a similar regulation of tobacco advertising,173 the result here seems
inconsistent with the Court’s views; and clearer guidance from the Court might have
avoided the divergence. In the cases involving regulation of sexually oriented businesses,
a forthright statements by the Court that in its view such regulations raise only the most
attenuated First Amendment concerns, which are easily trumped by concerns about
public morality, might have altered the result in all such cases where the claimants
prevailed. Finally, in the cases where courts are evaluating content-neutral regulations of
speech on private property, a recognition that neither of the critical factors counseling for
deference in other “intermediate scrutiny” cases – low-value speech or special regulatory
interests – is present might well lead appellate courts to take a far more skeptical stance
towards regulation.
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The above discussion represents a most preliminary survey of the possibilities for
doctrinal precision here. Each of the distinct bodies of law which have in recent years
become subsumed into “intermediate scrutiny” deserves a careful, independent analysis
of the relevant constitutional and regulatory policies that are raised therein. This will
take time and effort, both in the courts and in the scholarly literature. But the issues here
are sufficiently important, and the promise of improvement sufficiently real, that the
effort is worthwhile.

CONCLUSION
Over the past two to three decades, a new, overarching doctrinal test has emerged
in the area of free speech jurisprudence: the test of intermediate scrutiny. The test was
born as a result of the consolidation and merger of a number of distinct strands of First
Amendment doctrine, including notably public forum analysis, symbolic conduct
analysis, the commercial speech doctrine, and the Pickering balancing test for restrictions
on government employee speech. Since the mid-1990s, however, especially in the
decisions of the Courts of Appeals the intermediate scrutiny test has become, in Justice
Scalia’s words, a “default standard” applicable to essentially all free speech cases where
strict scrutiny is not, for some reason, appropriate. Its importance is thus very substantial.
In this paper, I have examined how First Amendment intermediate scrutiny
functions in practice in the United States Courts of Appeals. After examining in some
detail the very substantial body of intermediate scrutiny caselaw that has emerged,
especially over the past two decades, I conclude that the test does not in fact function
very well. In particular, when applying intermediate scrutiny the Courts of Appeals
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decide cases in ways that do not seem to conform with the policies expressed by Supreme
Court decisions, the decisions seem to systematically favor the government, and most
problematically, the pattern of the decisions as a whole does not seem to demonstrate any
coherent constitutional or social policy. In short, the cases show a judiciary which is
adrift.
The doctrinal solution I propose, which should alleviate at least some of the
dysfunctions revealed by an analysis of the cases, is disaggregation. I believe that the
doctrinal merger that has occurred should be reversed, and instead the Supreme Court,
and the judiciary generally, should restart the process of building distinct, detailed bodies
of jurisprudence within the different areas of free speech law currently subsumed in the
“intermediate scrutiny” rubric. Such a jurisprudence, or such a body of jurisprudences,
promise to provide clearer answers to the difficult questions raised in intermediate
scrutiny cases regarding the relative weights to be accorded speech and general societal
interests, and therefore to provide better guidance to the lower courts. This is an
important task for the simple reason that these cases matter. They matter because despite
the seemingly triviality of many of the individual cases, collectively their resolution has a
substantial impact on the shape and content of public debate in our country. And after
all, preserving the vitality of that debate is what the First Amendment is all about.
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